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In Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck and Co. I the plaintiff, an
employee of a contractor, sought damages for an eye injury
caused by a chip of metal which flew from the hammer he was
using to drive ordinary nails. The hammer, which had seven
other chips around the circumference of its face, bore the tat-
tered remnants of a label that warned the user to wear goggles
and to refrain from using the hammer to strike objects made
of steel harder than the hammer itself.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, reversing the court of ap-
peal2 and the trial court, held that the defendants, the manu-
facturer and the retailer of the hammer, had breached a duty
under Civil Code articles 24741 and 2545' to warn of the danger
of the propensity of a chipped hammer to chip further. This
breach constituted fault resulting in liability under article 2315
of the Civil Code.'
The opinion is troublesome both in its application of legal
doctrine and in the substantive policy it reflects. Turning first
to the issue of causation, a plaintiff's burden of proving the
casual relationship between his injury and the absence of a
warning traditionally has been met by a showing that more
probably than not the injury would not have occurred but for
defendant's failure to warn. In Chappuis the court found that
burden to have been satisfied in a novel way: "It would be an
unjustified assumption to say that store clerks, builders,
tradesmen and hammer users of all kinds would be ignorant of
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978).
2. 349 So. 2d 963 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), rev'd, 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978).
3. "The seller is bound to explain himself clearly respebting the extent of his
obligations: any obscure or ambiguous clause is construed against him." LA. Ctv. CODE
art. 2474.
4. "The seller, who knows the vice of the thing he sells and omits to declare it,
is answerable to the buyer in damages." LA. Civ. CODE art. 2545.
5. 358 So. 2d at 929. In describing "fault" under Civil Code article 2315, the
court cited Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
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the fact that a chipped hammer should be discarded if the
warning were disseminated with each sale (at the rate of two
million a year from one manufacturer alone)." 6 Although one
might interpret that language as the equivalent of "but for the
absence of the warning, plaintiff would have been aware of the
danger and would have discarded the chipped hammer," it is
difficult to find in the court's statement the satisfaction of the
"more probable than not" burden. Apparently the court found
as a fact that if all hammers had a warning, all hammers users
would have known of this danger and would not have used a
chipped hammer; but this is hardly so self-evident a fact as to
be subject to assumption or to judicial notice. If it is unjustified
to assume that hammer users would be ignorant of the danger,
it seems equally unjustified to assume that with a warning
hammer users would know of the danger and act responsibly.
The evidential leap seems all the more serious if one empha-
sizes that the court merely negated ignorance, which should
not be found to establish knowledge; it is the positive finding
of knowledge or awareness, whether actual or assumed, that
may be used in satisfying the burden of proof, not the mere
absence of ignorance.
The circumstances under which the injury occurred, as
recited in the opinion, are ones which a jury could easily inter-
pret as lacking the requisite link of causation by concluding
that the plaintiff more probably than not would have used the
hammer as he did regardless of the warning originally attached
to it or to two million other hammers. It is clear to this writer
that, by finding causation and by stating that a reasonable
warning would have removed dangerous hammers from use,'
the court was more concerned with enunciating a statement of
policy concerning hammer manufacturers than with deciding
whether this particular hammer, in its particular condition,
with the warning it bore at the time of sale, more probably than
not wrongfully caused the injury to this plaintiff.
As to the defense of possible plaintiff-fault, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff "did not know and could not reasona-
6. 358 So. 2d at 930.
7. Id.
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bly have been expected to know" of the hammer's dangerous
propensity to chip.8 The court noted that neither the plaintiff,
his immediate supervisor, nor his employer was aware that the
hammer had been damaged before the accident. Yet, the court
stated that the damage-causing chip was fitted into a larger
chipped place on the edge of the hammer and that experts had
located seven other chipped places in the edge of the face of the
hammer. Surely the court should require the reasonable user
of a hammer to note existing chipped spots and be aware of the
danger of further chipping if it assumes that he has the com-
mon sense to heed a warning attached to the handle at the time
of sale alerting him to that danger. The court should have
found that plaintiff, as a matter of law, was aware of what was
plain to see. For the future, if, as the court found, an adequate
warning on all hammer handles would imbue all hammer users
with knowledge of the danger, it seems to follow that within a
given time after such warnings have been disseminated, all
actions for chip-injuries will be barred.
On a broader note, the court came tantalizingly close to
settling the question whether contributory negligence is a de-
fense in so-called products liability cases The court stated
that if plaintiff had known or should have known of the danger
and had "[chosen], nevertheless, to use the dangerous instru-
ment,"'" he would not be entitled to recover because he would
then share the fault of the manufacturer. This language would
be a clear recognition of the defense of contributory negligence
except for the court's use of the words "knew" and "chose."
These words suggest the subjective awareness of a risk and a
voluntary encounter with it that are customarily associated
with assumption of risk rather than contributory negligence.
On balance, however, the recurrence of the phrase "share the
fault" lends weight to the interpretation that both defenses are
recognized.
The well-settled Weber rule" defining "defect" in products
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Khoder v. AMF, Inc., 539 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1976).
10. 358 So. 2d at 930.
11. A manufacturer of a product which involves a risk of injury to the user
is liable to any person, whether the purchaser or a third person, who without
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liability cases received a somewhat unsettling jolt in Chappuis.
As a foundation for overturning the trial and appellate courts'
decisions the supreme court held the following jury interroga-
tory to be inadequate: "Do you find any defect in the design
or manufacture of the hammer or do you find the defendants
otherwise at fault which caused plaintiff's injury?" The Weber
standard for a defect should be satisfied by the foregoing inter-
rogatory since that standard should be construed to include
that which might be found unreasonably dangerous for lack of
an adequate warning. Since the jury answered the interroga-
tory in the negative, it is a fair inference that the jury felt that
ordinary users could not complain about the potential for harm
from that particular hammer.
It is difficult to understand why the court reversed the
finding of the court of appeal that the hammer had been
abused or misused. It was uncontroverted that the hammer had
seven chips on the edge of its face at the time the injury-
producing chip flew into plaintiff's eye, a showing of abuse that
the supreme court negated by finding that "[t]he evidence is
uncontradicted that Chappuis did not abuse the hammer
... ,,12 It is irrelevant whether Chappuis or someone else
abused the hammer. The showing of abuse subsequent to the
hammer's leaving the hands of the manufacturer negates a
crucial element of plaintiff's burden, i.e., to show that the
product left the control of the manufacturer in its defective
condition.' The court of appeal found that the expert testi-
mony was unanimous to the effect that misuse had produced
those various chips and even that the particular chip which
caused the injury had been loosened by some previous misuse
of the hammer. It may be that the jury thought the expert
opinion was more probative than the plaintiff's testimony. The
Louisiana system of appellate review of fact would have been
fault on his part, sustains an injury caused by a defect in the design, composi-
tion, or manufacture of the article, if the injury might reasonably have been
anticipated. However, the plaintiff claiming injury has the burden of proving
that the product was defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous to normal use, and
that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by reason of the defect.
Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 602-03, 250 So. 2d 754, 755 (1971).
12. 358 So. 2d at 929.
13. See Stevens v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 349 So. 2d 948 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
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well-served if this case had been returned to the trial court for
submission to a jury on proper interrogatories and on the issues
of causation" and misuse, as well.
The legal theory on which recovery was based is even more
troublesome than the treatment of the foregoing factual issues.
The term "unreasonably dangerous to normal use," which fig-
ures prominently in Weber,5 was used by the court in
Chappuis in conjunction with the requirement of Civil Code
article 2474 that the seller explain himself as to the extent of
his obligation. The court then quoted article 2545 of the Civil
Code as furnishing the standard of care and Civil Code article
2315 as the basis for liability of the defendant to the plaintiff.
Article 2474 is found in the chapter concerning "the obligations
of the seller," and article 2545, a principal basis for actions in
redhibition, 8 is in the chapter dealing with "the vices of the
thing sold." The courts of Louisiana have not, until this case,
extended the obligations of articles 2474 and 2545 to a non-
purchasing consumer. It is true that Media7 made clear that
privity was not required for an action in redhibition, but no
court has seen fit to abolish the requirement that there be a
sale.
In the instant case the purchase was, made by the
contractor-employer and not by the plaintiff. It would stretch
things rather far if all the employees of large industrial con-
cerns had actions in redhibition against the sellers of the in-
dustrial equipment to their employers. It would be a value
judgment expansion of liability in sales far beyond anything
the court has done to date. In Weber, the court, through Justice
Tate, carefully avoided founding the plaintiff's action on the
sales articles by using the presumption of knowledge on the
part of the manufacturers as a foundation for negligence,
14. Another troublesome aspect of the causation issue is that the warning still
attached to the handle of the hammer admonished the user to wear goggles to avoid
the risk of injury. 358 So. 2d at 928. If the warning had been heeded, the injury would
not have occurred. Since plaintiff did not heed the warning that was given, is it fair
to believe that he would have heeded some different warning?
15. 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971)., See note 11, supra.
16. See Crawford, Products Liability, The Cause of Action, 22 LA. B. J. 239, 242-
43 (1975).
17. Media Prod. v. Mercedes-Benz, 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972).
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thereby basing recovery on negligence-fault under article 2315.
The consequences of allowing the plaintiff an action under
article 2545 are also quite serious in other respects: attorney's
fees are available to the plaintiff under article 2545, but not
under article 2315, and interest in the redhibitory action runs
from the date of judgment rather than from judicial demand
as in tort." If, as the court seems to have intended, the analysis
employed in Chappuis is an application of article 2545 imple-
mented through article 2315, great violence is done to the
scheme of the Civil Code.
The authority cited for this theory of liability is Professor
Stone's writing concerning article 667 of the Civil Code. 9 The
situation envisioned in article 667 in the Civil Code is quite
different from that in article 2545. The former article has no
accompanying implementation scheme for the assessment of
damages, while article 2545 contains the phrase "is answerable
to the buyer in damages." Even if that were not so, since redhi-
bition occurs in the title on sale, Civil Code articles 1930 and
following, which specify the manner of assessing damage for
the violation of contract, should regulate damages for viola-
tions of sale provisions.
In finding causation and defect as easily as it did in
Chappuis, the court pushed the liability of the manufacturer
beyond the realm of fault and into the realm of insurance. The
court in the opening paragraphs of its opinion acknowledged
most candidly that the hammer was well-made. It is also clear
that hammers made by the manufacturer and distributed by
Sears had for years contained a warning that hammers chip
and that safety goggles should be worn while using them. Little
more can be required of a manufacturer if the standard of care
imposed by the court is intended to be one which the manufac-
turer may comply with and rely upon to discharge its legal
duty. If the almost undischargeable burden that this decision
18. Crawford, supra note 16, at 244.
19. 358 So. 2d at 929 n.2, quoting Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Con-
cept of Fault, 27 TuL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1952). LA. Civ. CODE art. 667 provides: "Although
a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he can not make any work
on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may
be the cause of any damage to him."
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represents is to be placed on manufacturers, should not a bur-
den of equal weight be on the consumer? The plaintiff in
Chappuis was not wearing goggles as the warning which had
been on hammers for years demanded. Should not the con-
sumer be as heavily burdened with a duty of responsible care
as the manufacturer? The answer appears to be that he is not,
and it follows that product liability in truth is far closer to
insurance than one might surmise from viewing the elaborate
fictions of defect and causation now used by courts in products
liability litigation.
As has been suggested concerning the concept of no-fault
insurance for automobiles, a system of insurance administered
by the court within a structure of adversary litigation ostensi-
bly based on fault is excessively expensive for the public.2 If
fault is to be dispensed with in products liability, as it has been
in the area of workmen's compensation, there should be a re-
duced measure of damages to balance the scales.
CHILD LABOR STATUTE
In Boyer v. Johnson2 the supreme court held that the
death of a fifteen-year-old boy driving a commercial motor
vehicle in violation of child labor laws12 gives rise to a wrongful
death action on behalf of the decedent's parent under Civil
Code article 2315. The opinion is of great interest for both the
analytical approach used and the substantive result reached.
The decedent was hired by defendant to drive a Volks-
wagen panel truck in the course of defendant's business. Re-
vised Statutes 23:161(10) prohibits the employment of a minor
under eighteen years of age as a driver of a motor vehicle used
for commerical purposes. Decedent apparently lost control of
the vehicle and had the fatal accident.
The case bears no imprint of wretched exploitation of the
young. The decedent had his driver's license, and the defen-
dant had very carefully supervised his initial driving of the
20. See J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND 185-
88 (1975).
21. 360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1978).
22. The statutes at issue were Revised Statutes 23:161(4) (Supp. 1976);
23:161(10) (Supp. 1976); 23:163 (1950); 23:166 (1950); 23:211.1 (Supp. 1972).
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truck. Seemingly great care had been taken to insure dece-
dent's safe handling of the van.
The court construed the Child Labor Law as giving an
action for civil damages in favor of a minor injured in this
fashion. It further held, in keeping with the jurisprudence na-
tionally, that the contributory negligence of the minor is not
relevant because the public policy reflected in the enactment
of the Child Labor Law is the protection of the minor against
the risk of that very negligence. 3
The defense argued vigorously that the Child Labor Law
could in no way be construed to grant a wrongful death action
on behalf of a parent of a deceased minor. The opinion points
out correctly, analytically, that it is unnecessary to construe
the Child Labor Law as conferring that action. It suffices to
find that the minor died by defendant's fault, the fault being
found in the violation of the Child Labor Law; article 2315, not
the Child Labor Law, confers the wrongful death action upon
the parent. Of course, the counter-analysis is that the fault
scheme of article 2315 does not encompass the risk of a minor
being injured through conduct made wrongful solely by the
Child Labor statute. It should follow, then, that the granting
of the wrongful death action was a value judgment on the part
of the court that was not predetermined by legal analysis, as
the opinion itself says in clear language.
Three justices24 dissented on various grounds: that to ex-
tend this action to parents is an unwarranted extension of lia-
bility; that the issue of cause-in-fact was too easily resolved in
favor of plaintiff; and that the Child Labor Law should be
enforced solely by criminal sanction not carrying with it any
civil liability.
A footnote pointed out that the wrongful death action was
against the defendant in his individual capacity, not in his
capacity as president of the small family corporation that was
the nominal employer of the decedent. 25 The footnote noted
further than the defendant was vulnerable to personal liability
23. 360 So. 2d at 1169-70.
24. Justices Summers and Marcus and Chief Justice Sanders dissented.
25. 360 So. 2d at 1166 n.1.
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for his own personal fault, not for imputed or vicarious negli-
gence, since the fatal accident occurred prior to the effective
date of Act 147 of 1976,5 which limits the liability of executive
officers when the injured party is covered by workman's com-
pensation.
ABOLITION OF PEDESTRIAN CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A
DEFENSE FOR NEGLIGENT Drni
In Baumgartner v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co. 7 the supreme court abolished the contributory negligence
of a pedestrian-plaintiff as a defense available to the negligent
motorist who injured the pedestrian. The abolition of contribu-
tory negligence carried with it the abolition of last clear chance
as a bar to recovery by the pedestrian. The court in a footnote
correctly pointed out that the doctrine of last clear chance had
been misapplied when used to bar contributorily negligent
plaintiffs. 8 The doctrine was conceived to mitigate the harsh-
ness of that defense.
The evidence in Baumgartner showed that the driver was
clearly negligent in not seeing or attempting to avoid the pedes-
trian and that the pedestrian was guilty of conduct which could
easily be classified as contributory negligence. But the court
held that the lack of mutuality of risk between the car-encased
driver and the woefully exposed pedestrian renders the contest
unfair. The decision will give rise, in this writer's opinion, to
greatly strained analyses by lower courts to find the driver not
negligent in cases where the pedestrian was truly at fault in
bringing about his own injury. Chief Justice Sanders' dissent
will prove to be prophetically correct in this regard.2'
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The cases in the area of medical malpractice warrant at-
26. 1976 La. Acts, No. 147, amending LA. R.S. 23:1101 (1950).
27. 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978).
28. Id. at 406 n.8.
29. Already, the First Circuit Court of Appeal has found that the pedestrian ran
into defendant's automobile, not vice-versa, and that the crucial element of causation
was therefore lacking. Bonfiglio v. Dempsey, 360 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
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tention. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co." held
that Revised Statutes 9:279411 is retrospective in allowing testi-
mony as to the standard of care in a particular specialty to be
sought and introduced without regard to the locality of the
alleged injury. The opinion contains an exhaustive treatment
of the theories of retroactivity under the Civil Code, which turn
on whether the legislation at issue establishes new law or is just
an interpretive statute supposedly only putting into statutory
form the law which already existed.
Everett v. Goldman32 held the Medical Malpractice Act 33
to be constitutional insofar as it requires the filtering of claims
through a medical review panel and proscribes the use of an ad
damnum clause in the petition for damages. In keeping with
the jurisprudence nationally, Everett upheld the constitution-
ality of what may be termed procedural requirements for a
medical malpractice suit against a defendant covered by the
Medical Malpractice Act. The issue of limitation of damages
was not before the court and hence was not passed on. Every
state court which has passed finally on the question of limita-
tion of damages has held such limitation to be unconstitu-
tional."4
Vincent v. Voorhies,3" a decision of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeal, held that a medical malpractice suit filed in viola-
tion of the provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act, particu-
larly one that has not gone first to a medical review panel, is
premature, an objection correctly raised by the dilatory excep-
tion of prematurity. The court noted the decision in Everett
and rejected plaintiff's argument that the Act is unconstitu-
tional.
30. 360 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1978).
31. LA. R.S. 9:2794 (Supp. 1975).
32. 358 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978).
33. LA. R.S. 40:1299.41-.48 (Supp. 1975 & 1977).
34. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Assoc., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976); Simon v.
St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976).
35. 359 So. 2d 1129 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
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